Democracy as good in itself:Three kinds of non-instrumental justification by Rostbøll, Christian F.
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
Democracy as good in itself
Rostbøll, Christian F.
Publication date:
2016
Document version
Other version
Citation for published version (APA):
Rostbøll, C. F. (2016). Democracy as good in itself: Three kinds of non-instrumental justification. Paper
presented at Exploring Structures of Justification and Proportionality in Contemporary Constitutional Law,
Amsterdam, Netherlands.
Download date: 03. Feb. 2020
 1 
DEMOCRACY AS GOOD IN ITSELF:  
THREE KINDS OF NON-INSTRUMENTAL JUSTIFICATION 
Christian F. Rostbøll, University of Copenhagen, cr@ifs.ku.dk 
 
Paper prepared for presentation at the workshop “Exploring Structures of Justification and Proportionality 
in Contemporary Constitutional Law – Methods Against Injustice,” 
Amsterdam, January 29, 2016. 
 
Please note that is a first, very rough, draft (January 20, 2016) 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
This paper examines the idea that democracy is good in itself. It investigates what it means 
to give a non-instrumental justification of democracy, and considers the tenability of such 
justifications. While political theorists and philosophers in recent years have provided some 
strong accounts of the non-instrumental value of democracy, there seems to be some 
important differences in terms of what is meant by the notion of a non-instrumental 
justification of democracy. Moreover, there are persistent objections to non-instrumental 
accounts of the value of democracy that need to be countered if we want to hold on to the 
idea that democracy is good in itself. However, different objections apply to the different 
kinds of non-instrumental justifications of democracy. Thus, which objections are relevant 
depend on which kind of non-instrumental justification of democracy one defends. 
 
I discuss three different kinds of non-instrumental justification of democracy, and argue in 
favor of only one of these. The three kinds of democratic non-instrumentalism, I label (A) 
Aristotelian non-instrumentalism, (B) justice-first non-instrumentalism, and (C) Kantian 
non-instrumentalism. (A) justifies democracy with reference to the idea that it realizes 
distinctive human capacities. (B) justifies democracy on the basis of a norm that is specified 
in a theory of justice that is independent of democracy. (C) justifies democracy on the basis 
of a norm that can be fully understood only with the idea of democratic procedures. The 
three kinds of non-instrumentalism are importantly different, and they are subject to 
different objections. I argue that the objections to (A) and (B) are unsurmountable, while 
only (C) is a tenable non-instrumental justification of democracy. Indeed, I present the 
three kinds of non-instrumentalism in turn, and my arguments proceeds progressively 
moving from a presentation of (A), suggesting objections to it, turn to (B) to respond to 
these objections, introducing objections to (B), which (C) can meet. However, before I turn 
to the three kinds of democratic non-instrumentalism, I suggest that there is something 
amiss purely instrumental justifications of democracy.  
 
Thus, what we are interested in here is to provide a justification of democracy. I shall 
suggest that there are four requirements of a proper justification of democracy. (R1) The 
justification must take what Rawls calls “the fact of reasonable pluralism” seriously; that is, 
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it must recognize and accommodate the fact that citizens of modern societies are 
committed to different conceptions of the good. (R2) It must be able to explain standard 
democratic procedures and institutions, such as the equal vote, the right to run for office, 
the right to participate in public deliberation, and so on. This is a requirement of fidelity. 
(R3) The justification of democracy must be direct, independent, and robust. On the one 
hand, the justification must not be analytical or tautological, as if one were to say that 
democracy is good because it is democratic. On the other hand, there must be a clear and 
direct connection between the norm that justifies democracy and democratic procedures. 
The justification must be robust in the sense of not being dependent on contingent 
circumstances. (R4) Finally, a justification of democracy must show that democracy is not 
just good to have but is obligatory. It is not sufficient to show that democracy has some 
valuable features; it must be shown that these are sufficient to explain the authority and 
legitimacy of democracy. A justification of democracy of the right kind must be able to 
explain why democratic decision-making is morally binding (authoritative) and permissible 
to implement (legitimate).1 I cannot justify these requirements here, but at least R2-R4 
seem to me obviously internal to a justification of democracy, and they will also be further 
elaborated in the discussion below.2 
  
The structure of the paper is as follows. I begin in the next section (II) with an 
investigation of political-legal instrumentalism in general and democratic instrumentalism 
in particular. I need this as a general foil for non-instrumental accounts of politics, law, and 
democracy. I also suggest some general drawbacks of political instrumentalism. This is 
followed by three sections (III-V), each of which presents and discusses the three kinds of 
democratic non-instrumentalism. The argument here proceeds progressively, in the sense 
that objections to the first kind of justification (Aristotelian non-instrumentalism) lead to 
the second kind (justice-first non-instrumentalism), and similarly with the transition from 
the second to the third kind of non-instrumentalism (Kantian non-instrumentalism). 
Section VI further elaborates the Kantian justification of democracy and shows how it can 
incorporate some concerns in Richard Arneson’s rejection of the non-instrumental value of 
democracy. In particular, I argue that the Kantian justification is a justification of a specific 
form of democracy, namely constitutional democracy. In the proposed Kantian account, 
democracy is a constitutional form, and it is this constitution that creates the right kind of 
relationship among citizens and government. 
 
 
  
                                                          
1 Estlund XX; Kolodny 2014a, 197, 202; Pettit 2012, 137-8, 140; Simmons. One may make finer 
distinctions here, but for our purposes, we can collapse issues of authority, legitimacy and political 
obligation. 
2 I actually think R1 is also internal to a justification of democracy, but this requires further 
argumentation. See Cohen, "For a Democratic Society," 192 (undemocratic to assess the value of 
one another's way of life). 
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II. The limits of instrumentalism 
 
Non-instrumental justifications of democracy share a rejection of purely instrumental 
arguments for democracy. They do not necessarily reject that democracy has instrumental 
value or can be justified partly because of its good consequences, but they all share the 
view that democracy also has a value or a moral importance that cannot be accounted for 
merely by appeal to its external consequences. I begin with the idea of democratic 
instrumentalism, because it clarifies what a non-instrumental account of democracy is not, 
and what proponents of non-instrumental justifications regards as insufficient for a 
justification of democracy.  
 
The instrumental justification of democracy – “democratic instrumentalism” – holds, first, 
that the form of government that ought to be instituted is the one with the best 
consequences, and, second, that democracy is the form of government with the best 
consequences.3 Thus, on the instrumental justification, the end that justifies democracy can 
be fully defined and understood, independently of the idea (principles and institutions) of 
democracy. Democracy is, in this view, a mere means and of secondary importance to a 
more fundamental end, such as fundamental (not democratic) rights or social justice. If 
democracy proves not to be the best feasible means for the required end, it lacks 
(sufficient) justification, according to the instrumentalist view.  
 
We can see democratic instrumentalism as an instance of a more general idea of 
instrumentalism regarding law, government, and politics, or, for short, of political-legal 
instrumentalism. This instrumentalism perceives political and legal institutions as contingent 
means for the realization of valuable ends. Moreover, the ends of politics and law can be 
described in independent terms, that is, without any reference to the institutions that are 
the means to their realization. In the tradition of legal philosophy, we find such a form of 
instrumentalism both in the natural law theory of Thomas Aquinas and in the legal 
positivism of, for example, Jeremy Bentham and Hans Kelsen.4 There are, of course, 
differences between different versions of political-legal instrumentalism, among other 
things, in terms of what contingent or empirical obstacles law is supposed to overcome 
(e.g., man’s sinful nature) and which ends it promotes (human happiness, predictability, 
etc.). But instrumentalists share the view that the values that law and government exist to 
promote are pre-existing or fully conceivable independently of law and politics themselves. 
 
Non-instrumentalists (especially those of a Kantian bend) regard it as a fatal flaw of 
political-legal instrumentalism that the justification that it can provide is contingent on 
                                                          
3 Richard Arneson, "The Supposed Right to a Democratic Say." In Contemporary Debates in Political 
Philosophy, ed. Thomas Christiano and John Christman (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 197-
212, at 197. See also Van Parijs and Wall 2007. Rostbøll, "The Non-Instrumental Value of 
Democracy: The Freedom Argument," Constellations 22, no. 2 (2015): 267-278, at 268. 
4 See Harel 2014 and Ripstein 2009 who both describe this legal instrumentalism and advance non-
instrumental alternatives. 
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certain empirical factors holding true. Instrumental arguments are only as strong as the 
contingent causal relationships that they rely on. In this way, instrumental argument can be 
said to lack robustness. This point, however, does not bite democratic instrumentalists 
who, exactly, are committed to the idea that democracy cannot be given such a robust 
justification.5 Democratic instrumentalism is the idea that democracy is only justified 
contingently. This is a coherent position, even if others might want to explore the 
prospects of giving a more robust justification of democracy (as I do). What is more 
puzzling is the following view, expressed by one proponent, Steven Wall: Democratic 
instrumentalists “are prepared to recommend politically inegalitarian institutions if it can be 
shown that they yield better political outcomes over time.”6 One would think this translates 
into the idea that democratic instrumentalists are prepared to accept non-democratic 
institutions, if these produce better outcomes, but Wall continues, “one can favour 
democracy while rejecting political equality. This is the position recommended by 
democratic instrumentalism.”7 Here it becomes unclear how instrumentalists understand 
democracy if it does not include political equality, which is a defining characteristic of most 
accounts of democracy. Thus, it fails to meet the requirement that a justification of 
democracy should be able to explain standard democratic principles and institutions, such 
as political equality and universal and equal adult suffrage (R2). 
 
The drawback of democratic instrumentalism exhibited at the end of the last paragraph is 
that it cannot explain by itself which principles and institutions count as democratic and 
which do not. The good, but contingent, consequences that justifies democracy on the 
instrumental account – fundamental rights and social justice – can perhaps tell us which 
kind of government to establish, but they cannot tell us whether or how democratic the 
recommended procedures or form of government are. For the latter, it is parasitic on 
another account of democracy that can explain which procedures and principles are 
democratic and which are not.8 In this way, democratic instrumentalism fails not only to 
explain standard democratic procedures; it also cannot contribute to discussions of the 
democratic pedigree of more controversial institutions and practices (electoral systems, 
judicial review, etc.). To be sure, proponents of the instrumental approach can say that we 
should choose the institutions with the best consequences, but this says nothing about how 
democratic these institutions are or if they are democratic at all.9 
 
                                                          
5 Arneson 2009; Wall 2007. 
6 Wall 2007, 416. 
7 Wall 2007, 436. 
8 Rostbøll, ”Democratic Respect and Compromise,” CRISPP, forthcoming. 
9 Joshua Cohen (2010, 189) suggests that while non-instrumental reasons can supply a rationale for 
democracy, instrumental concerns can tell which kind of democracy to select. However, I don’t 
think we can separate the rationale for democracy and the kind of democracy to select so easily. 
Our justification for democracy will and should also say something about what is the right kind of 
democracy. But Cohen is right to say that instrumental concerns will play a role in determining 
exactly which institutions to select.   
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According to the instrumentalist view, the better the outcomes of a form of government 
the more legitimate it is. This view entails that we need agreement on outcome standards in 
order to determine how legitimate a form of government is. In other words, insofar as 
democratic instrumentalists favor democracy over other forms of government only when it 
realizes a certain ideal of social justice better than any feasible alternative, this justification 
of democracy is dependent on agreement on a specific view of social justice. This is a 
serious drawback if we think that a justification of democracy must take reasonable 
pluralism seriously (R1). If reasonable people disagree on what is the right theory of 
distribute justice, we should not ground democracy in its ability to promote a certain, 
controversial view of outcome justice.10 The idea of justifying democracy with reference to 
a theory of distributive justice would also depart in problematic ways from the reason why 
democratic citizens commonly view democratic decisions as legitimate. Most democratic 
citizens do not view democratic decisions as legitimate because they are substantively right, 
I think, but rather because of the way, they were made and because of the standing, they 
afford citizens.    
 
Another feature of democratic instrumentalism is that it does not claim that democratic 
decisions in each instance have better outcomes than non-democratic decisions. The idea is 
that democratic decision-making "yield better political outcomes over time."11 But if it isn't 
each decision but only the long term application of democratic procedures that has good 
consequences, we have a problem in explaining the bindingness of particular decisions. 
Why should I regard a decision as legitimate and authoritative, if not this decision but only 
the long term consequences of democratic decision-making are good?12 Thus, the 
instrumental justification fails also to meet the fourth requirement of a justification of 
democracy (R4). 
 
From this short review of democratic instrumentalism, we can understand the impetus for 
going beyond instrumentalism and exploring the prospects of a non-instrumental 
justification of democracy. First, if we want to find a robust, non-contingent justification of 
democracy, we must go beyond purely instrumental justifications and consider if 
democracy can be given a necessary, non-contingent justification. If democracy can be 
shown to be good in itself, we have found such a robust justification.13 Second, we must go 
beyond democratic instrumentalism if we are to explain standard democratic principles and 
procedures, as well as to explain why they (and which of them) are truly democratic. Third, 
instrumentalism is insufficient to explain the authority and legitimacy of democratic 
decisions. This is the case both because the justification is contingent on democracy's 
                                                          
10 Cf. Fabian Peter, Democratic Legitimacy, 62-4. 
11 Wall, "Democracy and Equality," 416. 
12 See Kolodny 2014a, 201-2; 2014b, 314-15 on this bridging problem. 
13 [However, I don't claim that we can find an unconditional justification of democracy, that is, a 
justification that applies at any time and place, without any empirical conditions. What I aim to 
arrive at is a non-instrumental but conditional justification of democracy. See Korsgaard on the 
notion of a non-instrumental but conditional goodness.] 
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actually producing valuable outcomes, but also because it is unclear why one is bound by 
each single democratic decision, when the alleged good effects are only products of 
democratic decision-making over the long run or as a rule. 
 
To be sure, democratic non-instrumentalists are not only driven by the failures of 
instrumentalism just mentioned. We are also driven by the intuition that if democracy is 
lost, more than the good consequences are lost.14 That is, the three kinds of non-
instrumentalism that I review below share a commitment to the idea that the good of 
democracy is integral to democratic institutions and not merely an external consequence of 
them.  
 
Before I proceed, note that I don’t take it as definitive of a non-instrumental justification of 
democracy that it excludes instrumental concerns, but rather that it is a justification that 
awards non-instrumental considerations fundamental or non-derivative importance. Thus, 
the point of democratic non-instrumentalism is to show that democracy is also good in 
itself and that this is an essential part of a justification of democracy – and not to exclude 
the possibility that a full justification of democracy might also include instrumental 
elements. 
 
 
III. (A) Aristotelian non-instrumentalism 
 
When we say that democracy is “good in itself,” perhaps the first idea that springs to mind 
is the idea that democracy is good because it involves an activity that is indispensable to a 
good life. And this, indeed, is the idea of the first kind of democratic non-instrumentalism. 
Or, to be more precise, the idea here is not just that democracy’s goodness stems from the 
joy that it affords people, but that democratic participation is of fundamental, primary, and 
objective importance to human happiness or a fulfilling human life. Many activities are 
enjoyable, but the first non-instrumental justification of democracy is committed to the 
idea that democratic participation is especially important, necessary for, and constitutive of 
the good life. I call this justification “Aristotelian non-instrumentalism,” because it relies on 
three Aristotelian ideas: First, that the good of a thing depends on the nature of that 
thing.15 Second, that the good of a living being is to be able to exercise its natural, highest, 
and distinctive capacities. Third, that human beings, as by nature political animals, realize 
their natural and highest capacities through political participation.16 This justification is 
perfectionist, because it is based on an idea of what perfect our nature as human beings: we 
become what we are supposed to become through participating in common decision-
making.17 
                                                          
14 Ceva & Ottonelli, “Rescuing Democracy from Reductionism,” unpublished manuscript. 
15 [NE] 
16 For a recent Aristotelian defense of democracy as good in itself, see Ober 2007. For an overview, 
see Kymlicka, 294-9.  
17 [On perfectionism, see Kymlicka 190, 294f, Wall 2009.] 
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There are different versions of this kind of non-instrumental justification. We find it, to 
mention some prominent examples, in J.S. Mill’s idea that democracy provides individuals 
with the opportunity to exercise their highest intellectual and moral capacities,18 and in 
Hannah Arendt’s notion of political action as a form of public happiness.19 Among 
contemporary political philosophers, Elizabeth Anderson has advanced the idea that 
democratic participation is a constitutive part of a good life.20 There are important 
differences among these theorists but they are sufficiently similar to classify them under 
one label. And, as I show presently, they share some common limitations. 
 
One objection to this first kind of non-instrumental justification of democracy is that the 
happiness involved in participation is an essential by-product, that is, the value of 
participation is dependent on and evaporates without the instrumental value of 
participation.21 However, this objection is only relevant if the idea were that the non-
instrumental value of participation was independent of democracy having also instrumental 
value. There might be tendencies to such a view in Arendt,22 but the Aristotelian 
justification could, without difficulty, be amended to the idea that the non-instrumental 
value of democracy is conditional on its instrumental value. Indeed, this is the view of 
Anderson, who writes, “The proper test of the noninstrumental goodness of an activity is 
not whether we’d prefer to do it, even if it didn’t result in desirable consequences. It is 
rather whether we’d still prefer to engage in it, even if the same consequences could be 
brought about by other (passive) means.”23 Thus, I don’t think this objection is damaging 
to the first kind, or any kind, of non-instrumental justification of democracy, as long as we 
recognize that the non-instrumental value of democracy is not unconditional.24 
 
The second objection to the Aristotelian justification of democracy is that not everyone 
finds political participation a constituent part of the good life, and that there is nothing 
unreasonable in this. Many people find more fulfillment in their work and their private lives 
than they do in politics, and it is difficult to establish that they are wrong. One might have a 
moral obligation to participate in the common life of the community and one might be 
blamed for not doing so, but this is a different issue of whether it is unreasonable not to 
find political participation fulfilling. And the Aristotelian justification depends on the latter. 
If the Aristotelian justification cannot establish that everyone does (or ought to) find 
fulfillment in democratic politics, its explanation for why one ought to have the 
                                                          
18 Mill, CRG, ch. 3. Mill also provides other justifications for democracy. 
19 Arendt, On Revolution, and HC, ch. V. 
20 Anderson, ”Democracy: Instrumental vs. Non-Instrumental Value.” 
21 (Elster 1997, 19-26). 
22 But see Rostbøll, “Statelessness, Domination, and Unfreedom: Arendt and Pettit in Dialogue,” in 
To Be Unfree: Republicanism and Unfreedom in History, Literature, and Philosophy, ed. Christian Dahl and 
Tue Andersen Nexø. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2014, pp. 19-36. 
23 Anderson, 225 
24 What we are looking for is the prospects of establishing the non-instrumental but conditional 
value of democracy, not the unconditional value of democracy. 
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opportunity to partake in politics lacks a foundation. Thus, Aristotelian non-
instrumentalism is incompatible with respect for reasonable pluralism and does not meet 
the first requirement of a justification of democracy (R1).25  
 
To the objection above, it might be replied that at least some people find fulfillment in 
political activity, and that they should have the same opportunity for pursuing their 
happiness as others have an opportunity to pursue theirs. The trouble with this idea is that 
political activity is importantly different from other activities that can be part of a 
conception of a good and fulfilling life. My opportunity for engaging in democratic politics 
demands something of my fellow citizens that other, private, activities do not. In order for 
me to have the opportunity to engage in democratic politics, my fellow citizens must “lend 
themselves” to this activity as co-legislators and as subject to the resulting decisions.26 If we 
cannot show that everyone shares my end, I will treat my fellow citizens as mere means to 
my end. Thus, we are still in violation of the requirement that a justification of democracy 
must be respectful of reasonable pluralism. You might say that, while R1 is a necessary 
condition for a liberal (or modern) justification of democracy, it is not necessary for a 
justification of democracy as such. But the following objections create further problems for 
the Aristotelian justification that goes to the heart of what democracy is about on most 
accounts.  
 
Turning to an objection to Aristotelian non-instrumentalism that concerns its democratic 
credentials, it is unclear whether it can explain the core democratic norm of political 
equality. For the Aristotelians, what is a constituent element of eudaimonia is to use the 
distinctive human capacity to speak, deliberate, and decide in common with others about 
public affairs.27 It seems that this interest in being able to use one’s highest capacities does 
not require opportunity for equal influence, which is a core norm of the democratic ideal.28 
Mill, for example, with his plural voting scheme, clearly thinks that it is sufficient for 
exercising one’s deliberative capacities that one had some opportunity for political 
influence, and not that the opportunity for influence be equal.29 Similarly, in Arendt, the 
opportunity for political participation is more important than any ideal of political 
equality.30 Thus, Aristotelians fail the second requirement of a justification of democracy, 
namely that it is able to explain standard democratic procedures and institutions. Now, this 
requirement should not be understood in a conservative spirit, as if a justification of 
democracy should not be able to be critical of actual political institutions. Rather, the 
                                                          
25 Kymlicka, 294-9; Rostbøll, “Non-domination and Democratic Legitimacy,” Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy 18, no. 4 (2015): 424-439. 
26 Kolodny 2014a, 216.1 
27 Ober 2007, 60. For Arendt (1990, p. 235, pp. 268-9) “expressing, discussing, and deciding” are 
“in a positive sense [...] the activities of freedom,” while having one’s interests represented through 
voting is not. 
28 Kolodny 2014a, 213, 215. 
29 Mill, CRG. 
30 See the end of On Revolution. Anderson’s approach, by contrast, does have a special concern with 
equality. 
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requirement is that a justification of democracy should be able to explain procedures that 
we can recognize as democratic. There might be a broad range of such procedures, but I 
suggest that procedures that fail to award all citizens equal opportunity for political 
influence are not among them.    
 
I would like to draw two main conclusions from the assessment of the prospects of an 
Aristotelian non-instrumental justification of democracy. First, it is unclear that this 
justification can explain the authority and legitimacy of democracy. Even if it could be 
shown that political participation were a valuable activity in itself, it is unclear that this is 
sufficient to show that we are morally bound to obey democratic decisions and that they 
are legitimate to implement. We must distinguish between an account that can show that 
democracy has some valuable inherent features and an account that can show that 
democracy is obligatory and legitimate.31 I think a justification of democracy must be of the 
latter kind. Moreover, as I have stressed, the problem of authority and legitimacy is 
exacerbated by the fact of reasonable pluralism. How can I be morally bound by a political 
procedure that is justified on the basis of a good that I do not share, and that I am not 
unreasonable to reject? How can it be legitimate to make me part of an activity and subject 
to its results simply for the sake of that others can fulfill their conception of the good life?  
Second, Aristotelian non-instrumentalism fails to explain standard democratic norms and 
procedures such as equal opportunity for influence and the equal vote. As such, it fails to 
show fidelity to our common understanding of democracy. Or, in other words, it is unclear 
that it qualifies as a justification of democracy at all. Therefore, I now turn to a second kind 
of democratic non-instrumentalism, which does better on these two counts than the 
Aristotelian one, but which is subjects to other objections. 
 
 
IV. (B) Justice-first non-instrumentalism 
 
The second kind of non-instrumental justification of democracy has the following 
structure. It begins with some important value or norm that is part of an independently 
conceived theory of justice and then proceeds, in a second and separate step, to show how 
this value or norm is expressed by or is part of democracy. The grounding value or norm in 
this justification stems from an "independently conceived theory of justice" in the sense 
that this value or norm can be and is fully described independently of any reference to the 
idea or institutions of democracy.32 I call this kind of justification of democracy for "justice-
first non-instrumentalism," because it begins with a theory of justice and assesses the value 
of democracy in light of this theory.33 It might be thought that this is the natural structure 
of justification in political philosophy – that is, that we need an independently conceived 
                                                          
31 Thanks to Arash Abizadeh for this point in a discussion of an earlier paper of mine. 
32 See Rostbøll, "The Non-Instrumental Value of Democracy," 270-1. 
33 [There is some similarity between this description of justice-first approach and the critical 
reference to "ethics-first" approaches found in the realism of Bernard Williams and Raymond 
Geuss, but my purposes are different.] 
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norm that can ground or justify what we aim to justify – but as we proceed, especially to 
the discussion of the third kind of justification, it should become clear that this isn't the 
case. 
 
As with the first kind of non-instrumental justification, there are different versions of the 
justice-first justification. I will discuss two, expressivism and disagreement theories. First, 
the type of expressivism that I am concerned with begins from a fundamental norm, and 
then goes on to suggest that democratic procedures are valuable because they express this 
norm, for example, that they express respect for the intrinsic equality persons. In this view, 
democracy is justified because it expresses something that we know to be of moral 
importance from a more fundamental, and independently conceived, theory of justice. 
Conversely, non-democratic regimes lack justification, because they fail to express the 
proper norm and thus insult citizens.34 
 
A second version of justice-first theories are (what I shall call) disagreement theories. These 
theories begin with the fact that people disagree on the justice of outcomes and argue that 
this is the reason why democracy must be defended non-instrumentally.35 We cannot 
defend democracy because of its good outcomes, if we disagree on standards for judging 
good outcomes (that is, if we don't have independent epistemic standards). The problem of 
disagreement does not touch on the justice of democratic procedures, in this view, because 
democratic procedures are tailored to the fact that people will disagree on the substance of 
justice.36 It might seem misleading to call this approach a form of justice-first non-
instrumentalism, if it is based on the idea that citizens will disagree on justice. However, if 
we consider one of the most prominent versions of the argument, that of Thomas 
Christiano, it quite clearly takes outset in and is grounded in a theory of justice. Indeed, his 
defense of the intrinsic value of democracy is based on "the principle that well-being ought 
to be distributed equally by the institutions of society."37 Thus, Christiano's justification of 
democracy relies on a fundamental principle of the equal advancement of interests.38 
 
Another prominent disagreement theorist, Jeremy Waldron, has argued exactly that 
political theorists should turn their attention more to political institutions and focus less on 
justice.39 Why, then, regard him as a justice-first theorist? The trouble with Waldron is 
when he treats the fact of disagreement as if it were sufficient to explain the need for 
democratic institutions. Sometimes he speaks as if the facts of interconnectedness and 
disagreement force people not only to come to terms with each other but to do so in a 
                                                          
34 [REFs] 
35 Christiano, Valentini, Waldron. 
36 Christiano, The Constitution of Equality, 95-96, 101-102. 
37 Ibid., 25. 
38 Rostbøll, "The Non-Instrumental Value of Democracy," 269, 271. 
39 According to Waldron, politics is not about determining what justice is, but, rather, about people 
disagreeing about justice coming to terms with each other (Waldron 1999, 3-4, 101-3). The fact of 
disagreement on ends or ideals is the reason why political theory should pay more attention to 
political institutions (Waldron 2013, 8). 
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democratic way.40 However, when we look at his argument for, for example, majority rule, 
it becomes clear that it is a principle of equal respect that is doing the normative work.41 
Thus, in Waldron it is the combination of the empirical premise of disagreement and the 
normative premise of respect for equality that justifies democratic rule. Moreover, the 
normative premise of equal respect is prior to his concern for political institutions, and it is 
an independently conceived principle that can justify democratic institutions under 
circumstances of disagreement.42 In this way, the justice principle of equal respect comes 
first in Waldron, that is, it comes before the democratic institutions that embody it.    
 
Compared to the Aristotelian non-instrumental justification of democracy, the justice-first 
approach seems to have three advantages: (1) It begins from disagreement and thus shows 
respect for reasonable pluralism (satisfying R1). Hence, it is not a sectarian justification that 
must explain why one must subject oneself to institutions that are justified with reference 
to a doctrine of the good one rejects. (2) It shows fidelity to democratic norms and 
institutions, that is, it is based on a fundamental commitment to equality, which can explain 
standard democratic procedures (R2). (3) Its grounding in norms of public equality and 
equal respect are good candidates for explaining the authority and legitimacy of democracy 
(R4). However, I am unsure about the non-instrumental credentials of this justification 
(that is, that it really is a properly non-instrumental justification), and whether it provides a 
direct and sufficiently robust justification of democracy (R3). 
 
There are reasons to question whether the justice-first approach is properly non-
instrumental. Disagreement theories begin with some contingent problems that democratic 
procedures are meant instrumentally to solve.43 More fundamentally, I think the problem is 
the structure of these theories. They assume that citizens have an independently defined 
interest in some X – an interest in equal respect, unbiased decisions, fulfillment of desires, or 
the like – and suggest that democracy can satisfy this interest. Thus, in this view, 
democracy is seen as providing some benefit to citizens in terms of their interests or even 
wellbeing. This is not a direct and robust justification of democracy, but is dependent on 
some contingent relationships. Thus, the justice-first justification does not fulfill the third 
requirement of a justification of democracy (R3). 
 
The concern I have just raised might mean justice-first non-instrumentalism doesn't do as 
well, as we initially thought, regarding the other requirements of a justification of 
democracy. The justification seems to be in a greater quandary. On the one hand, it can 
insist on its non-instrumental credentials and maintain that it is not based on substantive 
interests regarding outcomes. In this way it fulfills R1 (respect for disagreement on 
outcomes) and R3 (direct justification). However, it is not clear that this explanation is 
                                                          
40 Waldron, "What is Cosmopolitan?" 241. 
41 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 108-18. 
42 Rostbøll, "Kant and the Critique of the Ethics-First Approach to Politics." 
43 In Christiano, for example, democracy is an instrument to solving empirical problems of 
cognitive bias. Kolodny 2014, 204 n 11. 
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sufficient to explain standard democratic procedures, because also other decision 
procedures show equal respect for citizens or treat them as an equal, e.g. a lottery or a coin 
flip.44 On the other hand, justice-first theorists can claim that only standard democratic 
procedures satisfy equal treatment in the right way. But this reply depends on a specific 
conception of equality or a specific theory of justice, which will be controversial (violating 
R1), and it will have an instrumental dimension. A third option is to say that this theory of 
equality or fairness is one that is designed to fit the democratic procedures and, thus, is not 
a detached conception of fairness or equality.45 I think the latter is the right direction to go, 
but it requires fundamental amendments to the justice-first structure of justification, and it 
pushes us toward the third non-instrumental justification of democracy.  
 
 
V. (C) Kantian non-instrumentalism 
 
The third kind of non-instrumental justification of democracy differs from the second kind 
in that it does not ground democracy in some norm that is fully described in or is part of 
an independently conceived theory of justice. Rather, it is committed to the idea that 
democracy's justification lies in something (a norm) that can be fully conceived only in 
conjunction with the idea of democracy itself. This approach is similar to what I take to be 
a Kantian form of non-instrumentalism,46 which has the following form: X is non-
instrumentally justified, when it is justified with reference to a norm N that cannot be fully conceived 
without the idea of X itself. This is a constitutive justification in the sense that X constitutes the 
norm N that justifies X. In Kant's Rechtslehre, or the “Doctrine of Right” (the first part of 
The Metaphysics of Morals), we find such a form of justification when he argues that a public 
legal order (or the constitutional state) is justified by the idea of freedom as independence, 
while the idea of freedom as independence cannot be fully conceived independently of the 
idea of a public legal order, with public and reciprocal coercion.47 
 
Applying a form of Kantian non-instrumentalism to democracy, democracy is not merely 
justified, because it gives expression to or promotes some pre-existing value; it is justified 
as creating and constituting something of fundamental moral importance. And this 
"something" cannot be fully conceived without the idea of democracy itself. By establishing 
and maintaining democratic rule we create this N, which itself justifies democracy. 
 
Our first justification of democracy shares the idea of the constitutive value of democracy 
with the Kantian view. Thus, in the Aristotelian view, we cannot fully understand the value 
                                                          
44 Estlund, ch. 4. 
45 Christiano (2009, 231) in his reply to Estlund. 
46 When I talk about "Kantian democratic non-instrumentalism," this is not because it is a view held 
by Immanuel Kant himself, but because it is a form of non-instrumentalism inspired by core 
Kantian ideas. 
47 Ripstein; Rostbøll, "Kant, Freedom as Independence, and Democracy" Journal of Politics 
(forthcoming). Alon Harel's "reciprocity hypothesis," according to which legal rights do not merely 
promote given values but create values has a similar structure.  See Why Law Matters, esp. ch. 2. 
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of living in a political community without reference to the latter; that is, the value of 
political activity is constituted and created by the activity itself.48 However, there are two 
important differences between the Aristotelian and the Kantian view. First, the good that is 
constituted by democracy in the Aristotelian view is understood in terms of conferring a 
form of benefit on individuals, a form of well-being or happiness. In the Kantian view, by 
contrast, what is constituted is a norm for how individuals ought to relate to each other. 
There is no reference here to any benefit to individuals but only to an idea of how 
individuals ought to stand in relation to one another. Second, the "thing" that constitutes 
the value in the Aristotelian view is political activity; it is only by participating in politics 
that citizens exercise their highest capacities and thus attain true happiness. In the Kantian 
view, by contrast, what constitutes the norm are public, binding, and entrenched 
democratic rights that create the right relationship between citizens and government. 
 
Before we get to the N of the Kantian justification, let me elaborate on the form or 
structure of the justification. Here the contrast to the first kind of justification is important. 
In the Aristotelian justification, what justifies democracy is an ideal for the content of the 
lives citizens ought to live, namely, the ideal of exercising one's natural capacities to the 
fullest degree possible. The Kantian justification, by contrast, does not see democracy as 
constituting some particularly valuable or enjoyable form of life for citizens, but, rather, as 
constituting a particular and obligatory relationship between citizens and government.49 By 
establishing democratic government, citizens and government are related to one another in 
the right way. We might say the same about the justice-first justification, that is, that 
democratic government is justified because it relate citizens in the right way, for example as 
equals. However, in the Kantian justification, democratic government does not merely 
relate citizens to each other in a way that we know is right from an independently 
conceived theory of justice; rather, it constitutes a relationship between citizens and 
government that we cannot even think without thinking democratic government. The 
norm that justifies democracy is partly created by the democratic organization of the political 
community. 
 
One recent and important book advancing a form of political-legal non-instrumentalism is 
Alon Harel's Why Law Matters. Harel argues that the constitutional state – with its binding 
norms and entrenchment of rights – not merely promotes pre-given values, but partly 
creates values. The constitutive argument that he advances, however, still has an 
Aristotelian (and Millian) aspect, insofar as he argues that the value that the constitutional 
state and rights constitute is the value of being able to exercise autonomous choice. For 
                                                          
48 Ober's reference to exercise of highest faculties is not constitutive – we can understand them 
independently of democracy. But we cannot understand idea of zoon politikon independently of 
politics. Note, by the way, that Aristotle says that humans are political beings, not that we are 
democratic beings. 
49 Rostbøll, “Kantian Autonomy and Political Liberalism,” Social Theory and Practice 37, no. 3 (July 
2011): 341-364; "The Non-Instrumental Value of Democracy"; "Non-Domination and Democratic 
Legitimacy". [Morality about how to relate to each other, Korsgaard] 
 14 
Harel, "it makes people's life better if, and to the extent that, they exercise [autonomy] in 
their lives."50 The constitution should "facilitate the realization of autonomy" and sustain "a 
liberal autonomy-enhancing society."51 Paradoxically, Harel presents his non-
instrumentalism as a superior alternative to Joseph Raz's idea that rights exist to promote 
pre-given values but still holds on to Raz's idea of the grounding value of the exercise of 
autonomy. Kantian non-instrumentalism, as I understand it, goes further – it is more 
strictly non-instrumental – by rejecting that political-legal institutions should be justified 
with reference to the promotion of any kind of value for our individual lives, including the 
value of the free exercise of choice. The idea that we should see autonomous lives as better 
lives is also incompatible with reasonable pluralism.52 
 
On the Kantian justification, democracy is not merely an activity but a constitutional form, 
a specific, formal organization of the state or the political community. Sometimes 
"democracy" is used as a vague reference to a general principle (of collective self-
government, participation, or majority rule) rather than to a specific constitutional form. 
Moreover, Kant himself called (direct) democracy a "non-form" (Unform).53 Today, 
however, by "democracy", we mean representative and constitutional democracy, and this 
is not a non-form. Democracy, as we commonly use the term, refers to a complex 
constitutional structure with entrenched constitutional rights, representation, and some 
division of power. Of course, democracy is used to refer to a range of different institutional 
set-ups, but normally it is used to refer to a form of government, a constitution. On the 
Kantian justification, it is the constitutional system of democracy that is justified, and 
which is seen as constituting a specific relationship among citizens and government. This is 
an important point that is often insufficiently emphasized in discussions of the justification 
of democracy.54 
 
The Kantian justification of democracy, then, entails that we view democracy as a way of 
constituting society. By this, I mean that democracy is a specific way of relating citizens to 
each other and of relating citizens to their government.55 I invoke the notion of 
"constitution" both to highlight the constitutive aspect of democratic institutions but also 
to emphasize the public, positive, legal and, thereby, binding character of the democratic 
relation between citizens and state. In the Kantian account, the way citizens and 
government are related is publically and legally entrenched in a system of rights. When we 
see democracy as a constitution of society, and as legally entrenched in a system of rights, 
this entail that a democratic society is something we – citizens and government – are duty-
                                                          
50 Harel, Why Law Matters, 40. 
51 Harel, Why Law Matters, 44. 
52 Rostbøll “Autonomy, Respect, and Arrogance in the Danish Cartoon Controversy,” Political 
Theory 37, no 5 (October 2009): 623-648; "Kantian Autonomy and Political Liberalism." 
53 Kant, PP, 352. 
54 Cf. Arneson, 198 and sec. VI below. 
55 Some might say that democracy is about relating citizens and government and not about relating 
citizens to each other (Pettit 2015), but the democratic constitution of society also matter for how 
citizens stand in relation to each other [Cohen, democratic society]. 
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bound to uphold.56 The legal-constitutional entrenchment is essential both because it 
entails common knowledge and acknowledgement of the standing of citizens and because 
it involves recognition of this standing as a matter of unconditional importance and good 
as such (rather than as a contingent and optional means to some good consequences).57 
 
Until now, I have presented the third justification of democracy more in terms of form 
than content, and it has been important for me to show how the Kantian justification is 
unique exactly in terms of form or structure. However, we cannot justify democracy 
without also speaking content. This we can see, when we ask why the constitution of 
society must democratic. It could be said that other ways of constituting society also 
constitute specific and valuable relationships between citizens and government. Indeed, 
Kant himself gave a non-instrumental justification of the constitutional state or the 
Rechtsstaat, and his ideal republic does not meet contemporary standards of democracy.58 
Thus, establishing a public legal order, the rule of law, and protecting civil rights might be 
thought to be sufficient for securing the required standing of citizens. Why must the 
constitutional state also be a democratic state? If we want to provide a non-instrumental 
justification of democracy, we cannot appeal to the idea that democratic states are better at 
protecting individual rights or at promoting other values. We can answer the question of 
the non-instrumental importance of democracy only by specifying what the norm that the 
democratic constitution of society constitutes or creates is. What is it that is realized by a 
democratic constitution and which cannot be realized or even fully understood without the 
idea of democracy? 
 
The very form of the Kantian justification entails that the "good" realized by political-legal 
institutions cannot be some independently identified good for the individual person or a 
benefit one can enjoy on one's own. Nor is it some benefit of communal living in the 
communitarian sense.59 Rather, the political constitution is something that relates citizens 
to one another in the normatively required way.60 And this normatively required way of 
relating citizens to each other cannot be explained in terms of – or derived from – some 
interests individuals have; it has a moral importance in its own right. This means that on 
the Kantian justification, democracy cannot be grounded in an idea of welfare or even in an 
interest in being individually self-governing. The latter are independently conceived ideas 
                                                          
56 Harel gives a good account of the importance of the bindingness of constitutional norms, but he 
sees these norms as constraining rather than constituting democracy. For him, "democracy" most 
often refers to majority rule and decisions by the legislature, rather than to the democratic 
constitution of society. See Why Law Matters, 7, 152, 189.  
57 [Democratic constitution of society does not mean that all relations are democratic but that non-
democratic relations (e.g. in the workplace) are regulated by democratic decision-making (see 
Kolodny, Habermas).] 
58 However, see my "Kant, Freedom as Independence, and Democracy"; Maliks; Jacob Weinrib, 
"Kant on Citizenship and Universal Independence." Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 33 (2008): 
1-25. 
59 Sandel. 
60 Rostbøll, "Kant, Freedom as Independence, and Democracy." 
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that would reduce democracy to a type of means to a given end. This leaves us with some 
idea of standing – a standing that can be fully understood and realized only with the idea and 
constitution of democracy itself. 
 
What kind of standing, then, does democracy constitute or realize? The predominant 
answer is the standing of being an equal – hence, the apt title of Christiano's important 
book on democracy, The Constitution of Equality. However, it is clear that not just any 
conception of equality will do if we are to meet our second requirement of a justification of 
democracy, namely, that it should be able to explain democratic procedures, as we 
commonly understand them. Other forms of decision-making, for example, decision by a 
coin flip, gives every citizen an equal standing.61 As mentioned at the end of section IV, this 
pushes equality theorists to suggest that their conception of equality must be one that fits 
democratic procedures. Thus, the conception of equal standing that justifies democracy is 
one that cannot be fully understood without the idea of democratic procedures of decision-
making themselves. Elsewhere, I have suggested that we can understand this idea of 
equality only with the inclusion of some idea of autonomy or freedom.62 Thus, the standing 
constituted by democracy is a form of equal freedom. 
 
Some theorists have thought that the rule of law or the Rechtsstaat is sufficient for equal 
freedom – indeed, some constitutive legal-political non-instrumentalists, including 
Kant(ians), have thought so.63 For them, the rule of law and individual rights secure the 
impersonality and the distinction between office and persons that are essential for equal 
freedom. However, while the rule of law is crucial for equal freedom, I doubt that it is 
sufficient to secure and realize that no one is subject to the will of another. Positive laws 
must be given by someone and cannot be treated as natural phenomena.64 Democratizing 
the constitutional state entails realizing and constituting another or more expansive 
understanding of equal freedom than is realized by the rule of law by itself. In a non-
democratic constitutional regime, everyone may enjoy equal freedom as subject to law, at 
least in principle. But, by definition, only some of the members have the standing of rulers 
and political decision-makers.  Thus, the idea that is constituted by democracy and that can 
be fully understood only with the idea of democracy is the idea of equal standing as co-
rulers or participants in common law-making. The idea of democracy entails that laws are 
some that must be made, and that everyone (or all adult citizens) must be able equally to 
participate in doing so. 
 
The idea of having standing as a co-ruler cannot be grounded in some idea of satisfying an 
interest in getting what one wants. As may have pointed out, democracy does not secure 
that the desires or preferences of everyone are satisfied, nor does it make the individual 
                                                          
61 Estlund. But see Kolodny 2014a, 227-8. 
62 Rostbøll, "The Non-Instrumental Value of Democracy"; "Kant, Freedom as Independence, and 
Democracy." 
63 Harel, Kant, Ripstein. 
64 Rostbøll, "The Non-Instrumental Value of Democracy"; Kolodny 2014b, 311f. 
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self-governing.65 The Kantian argument also does not dependent on the latter, but only on 
the idea that democracy constitutes a type of relationship between citizens and government 
in which everyone has an equal opportunity to influence law-making. And, crucially, who 
are elected to decide and which laws are passed should be a result of the application of 
constitutional procedures that treat everyone as equal co-rulers rather than being decided 
independently of these procedures. When my policy preferences fail to be mirrored in law 
making to the extent I would have preferred, I should be able to see this as a result of 
constitutional procedures that gave me an equal standing as all other citizens rather than 
the result of some independent factors. When the decision is a result of such a procedure 
and the result does not violate my standing, I must regard the decision as authoritative and 
legitimate even if I find it substantively unjust. The reason for the latter cannot be 
explained with reference to some interest in being self-governing or preference satisfaction, 
but can be grounded in the standing created by a democratic constitution. 
 
While I regard democracy as constituting equal freedom in a stronger sense than the rule of 
law on its own, I don't see the two as justified separately. For the Kantian, what can be 
justified is constitutional democracy and not some unconstitutional form of democracy.66 
The standing afforded to citizens by democratic rights of participation augments the 
standing of the legal person constituted by the Rechtsstaat; it does not replace it. Of course, 
it is vague or indeterminate what this combination of constitutionalism and democracy 
entails in institutional terms. However, it is exactly the point of our whole enterprise of 
clarifying the justification of democracy that it can contribute to determine which kind of 
(constitutional) democracy to establish. How we justify democracy affect what kind of 
democracy we should favor. The Kantian would look for what kind of relationships among 
citizens and government are realized by different institutional configurations or different 
kinds of democracy. What kind of constitution is required for realizing a system of equal 
freedom? (Again, the idea of a system of equal freedom here cannot be understood 
independently of the political-legal institutions that constitute it.) 
 
It might be objected that I give only an analytical defense of democracy, since the idea of 
standing as co-ruler is part of definition of democracy. And, the objector might continue, 
we have added no substantive weight to the case for democracy if all we have done is to 
give a justification of democracy that does not go beyond a definition of democracy. 
However, we should not accept that the only proper justifications of democracy are those 
that either (1) show that democracy is the best feasible means to some good end, or (2) 
express or embody some value that can be identified independently of democratic decision-
making. This would leave us with only instrumental and justice-first justifications of 
democracy.67 My argument is exactly that these are not the only two possibilities. The 
                                                          
65 Buchanan; Christiano; Kolodny; Mill; Van Parijs. 
66 Rostbøll, "Kant, Freedom as Independence, and Democracy." 
67 For an example of a critique of merely analytical defenses of democracy that makes the only 
possible justifications of democracy instrumental ones, see Frank Lovett, A General Theory of 
Domination and Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 210ff. 
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Kantian justification of democracy is neither analytical, nor is it instrumental (empirical), 
nor does it rely on independently specified values. Rather, it relies on a norm that has some 
meaning independently of democracy but which can be understood fully only in 
connection with the idea of (constitutional) democracy, because it is created and 
constituted by the latter.68 
 
In sum, I propose that Kantian non-instrumentalism fulfills the four requirements of a 
proper justification of democracy. First, it respects reasonable pluralism because it relies on 
neither agreement on a substantive theory of outcome-justice nor a sectarian conception of 
the good life (R1). Second, insofar as it begins from democratic institutions and is based on 
the standing realized by these, this justification fulfills the requirement of fidelity (R2). 
Third, Kantian non-instrumentalism gives a direct, independent, and robust justification of 
democracy. It is not dependent on contingent factors, and it can explain why political 
decision-making must always respect the standing of citizens as equally free (R3). Finally, 
our third non-instrumental justification can show that democracy is not merely good to 
have but is authoritative and legitimate. (R4). In the Kantian view, the relationship among 
citizens and government realized by constitutional democracy does not satisfy some 
interest or good of individuals; it is right in and of itself. Thus, according to the Kantian 
justification we should not understand the idea that democracy is good in itself to mean 
that it realizes some benefit to the citizens but, rather, as a matter of constituting a standing 
and relationship among citizens and government that is obligatory to establish as a matter 
of right.   
 
 
VI. Democracy and directing the lives of others 
 
Having presented three different kinds of democratic non-instrumentalism and indicated 
the superiority of the third, the Kantian justification, we are in a position to confront the 
perhaps strongest challenge to the idea that democracy is good in itself. This challenge has 
been posed by Richard Arneson. The main premises of Arneson's objection to non-
instrumental arguments for democracy are (1) that the vote is "a special power to direct the 
life of others," and (2) that such a right can be justified only derivatively or instrumentally; 
that is, if it "in the given circumstances would fairly advance the interests of all persons 
affected by it."69 In addition, Arneson argues that respect for equality and mutual respect 
can be sustained by "morally defensible outcomes," that is, the rule of law and the 
protection of moral rights.70 
  
Arneson's argument is not only a form of democratic instrumentalism but also seems to be 
committed to the more general idea of political-legal instrumentalism. The latter, 
remember, is the idea that political-legal institutions are contingent means for the 
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realization of valuable ends that, on their side, can be described independently of the 
institutions that are the means to their realization. Thus, Arneson operates with ideas of 
fundamental interests and moral rights that can be understood independently of the state, 
whose "primary proper job" it is to advance and safeguard them.71 This commitment to 
political-legal instrumentalism entails blindness to the way in which political institutions 
and the legal entrenchment of rights not merely promotes something as a means but 
creates something new of moral importance. For Kantian non-instrumentalists, the public 
legal order (or the constitutional state) does not merely advance pre-political interests or 
moral rights; it constitutes a system of equal freedom, which can be fully conceived only 
with the idea of a public legal order itself. 
 
Arneson agrees with Kant that coercion is not in and of itself morally wrong. If coercion is 
used for good moral reasons, it is acceptable, even right, according to Arneson (and 
Kant).72 However, the idea that coercion – as monopolized in the modern state and as 
ideally following principles of the rule of law – is not wrong in itself does not entail that it 
must not be legitimated. As I mentioned above, the coercive laws have to be given by 
someone, and it has to be decided who that should be. Political rule, also in the form of the 
rule of law, is always a case of some having power to direct the lives of others. Of course, 
Arneson recognizes that the state has such a power and thinks its power is legitimate when 
it is used for the right purpose (to safeguard people's important moral rights). But it is 
unclear why he thinks that the power of the democratic vote requires such a strong 
justification, while he does not think coercion as such is "morally momentous."73 My point 
is that it is not democracy that introduces the state of affairs in which some people can 
exercise power over others; this state of affairs characterizes any form of political rule. For 
Kantians, political-legal rule is not a threat to but potentially constitutive of a system of 
equal freedom for mutually affecting human beings. When it has been established that a 
public legal order is necessary, the question is not whether someone should have the right 
to exercise power over others but who should have this right – only some or everyone. A 
justification of democracy is not, as such, a justification of the exercise of state power (that 
comes in a prior step), but a justification of how that power should be organized.74 
 
A final point to be stressed here is that criticisms of non-instrumental justifications of 
democracy sometimes assume that the justification is of the right to vote and majority rule 
existing in some constitutional vacuum. Thus, it is (implicitly) assumed that the democratic 
right to direct the lives of others is a right of the majority to decide whatever it prefers. 
However, I have emphasized that the Kantian justification specifically is of constitutional 
democracy. Insofar as the Kantian justification is grounded in the standing of everyone as 
an independent being realized by a democratic constitution, democratic majorities are 
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constrained from making decisions that violate this constitution.75 Thus, democratic 
majorities do not have the power to direct the lives of others at whim or as they please, but 
only to make laws that are necessary for and consistent with a system of equal freedom, 
including equal opportunity to influence political decision-making. What constitutes the 
morally required relationship between citizens and government is the constitutional system 
as a whole. Arneson is right when he writes that democratic non-instrumentalists owe an 
account of how much democracy – or I would say, what kind of democracy – is non-
instrumentally justified.76 And that, I think, is exactly what the Kantian justification can do, 
even if I have only been able to lay the foundation for this enterprise in this paper. 
                                                          
75 See Christiano, The Constitution of Equality, 299. But Christiano distinguishes a justification of 
democracy from a justification of constitutionalism, while I provide a justification of constitutional 
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